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Porter hypothesisThis paper estimates the effect of energy tax (and price) changes on Total Factor Productivity (TFP) and net trade
at the industry level, using a panel of industries from European countries covering the period 1990–2003. We
investigate the hypothesis that industries with high adaptive capacity (measured by their relative level of labour
compensation) are able to mitigate the adverse effects of energy tax rises better than others. We identify the
pro-adaptation effect by interacting wage levels (a proxy for human capital) with energy taxes. We ﬁnd that
the negative marginal effect of higher energy taxes on TFP and net trade is signiﬁcantly reduced for industries
with stronger human capital and even turns to an overall positive effect in at least two cases. Up to three low-
wage sectors display an overall negative effect. This suggests that human capital is key to adaptation to higher
energy costs and climate policy, in some cases making it a win-win.
© 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Whereas opponents to the regulation of CO2 emissions often cite
scientiﬁc uncertainty about the magnitude of climate-change risks,
there is as much if not more uncertainty about the cost of cutting emis-
sions. Technical change is at the heart of that uncertainty. As Jaffe et al.
(2003, p.463) note, “[i]n global climate change modeling […] different
assumptions about autonomous improvements in energy efﬁciency
are often the single largest source of difference among predictions of
the cost of achieving given policy objectives.” The uncertainty is not
only about the magnitude of the cost of environmental regulation;
there is also controversy about its sign. In inﬂuential articles, Porter
(1991) and Porter and van der Linde (1995) argued that well-designed
environmental regulation could be a spur to innovation, ultimately
making regulated ﬁrms more competitive. Ambec et al. (2013) provide41 32 718 14 01.
), olivier.cadot@unil.ch
ppe.thalmann@epﬂ.cha recent review of theoretical and empirical insight on the Porter
Hypothesis (PH). They distinguish between behavioural arguments,
market failures (market power, asymmetric information, research
and development (R&D) spillovers) and organizational failure (see for
example Ambec and Barla, 2002).
Arguments similar to the Porter Hypothesis were made by DeCanio
(1993) and Lovins (1996). Building on the “evolutionary” tradition of
the economics of R&D (Nelson and Winters, 1982) which views ﬁrms
as boundedly rational, Gabel and Sinclair-Desgagné (1993, 2001) pro-
posed a model in the same vein, in which the enforcement of environ-
mental regulation overcomes organizational failures within ﬁrms,
leading them to becomemore efﬁcient overall. Later attempts at formal-
izing the Porter Hypothesis (e.g. Ambec and Barla, 2002; Mohr, 2002)
based the argument onmarket failures other than environmental exter-
nalities (barriers to innovation – network externalities, lock-in effects,
or imperfect information – or external economies of scale in produc-
tion), behavioural or organizational failures. Attributing a strategic
role to technology adoption Mohr (2002) introduces external econo-
mies of scale in production. The productivity of any given agent depends
on the cumulative production experience of all agents using the same
technology. In this setting external economies of scale can explain
why ﬁrms might rationally avoid the short-term cost of experimenting
with new technologies. Environmental policy could therefore indeed
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ronmental regulation allows ﬁrms to overcome organizational inertia
(e.g. private information of managers about real costs of new technolo-
gies that might be used to extract rents from the ﬁrm).
While theoretical arguments are sound, the evidence, reviewed in
Section 2 of this paper, is largely ambiguous. One of its key insights,
which came out in an important recent paper (Commins et al., 2011),
is that the effect of energy-tax shocks varies substantially across sectors.
These results suggest that aggregate effects of environmental policy
changes are likely to hide substantial cross-sectoral heterogeneity.
We build on this literature and extend it by looking for factors
driving adaptability at the industry level, more precisely focusing on
the role of human capital. The intuition is that if adaptation requires
technical innovation or the reorganization of production processes,
the availability of human capital is likely to help. Suppose e.g. that
ﬁrms face costs to implement energy-efﬁciency programs helping
them to reduce energy costs. Sectors with skilled workforces will have
less difﬁculty implementing such programs and will see their perfor-
mance deteriorating less as a result of higher energy prices. In addition
to facilitating direct adaptation at the ﬁrm level, human capitalmay also
facilitate the diffusion of best practices (e.g. Battisti et al., 2009).
Speciﬁcally, our approach analyses the response of industry TFP to
changes in energy taxes and prices (net of taxation). Our dependent
variable is TFP constructed either as an index or through estimation
via a production-function approach. Results are similar under the two
approaches.4 In robustness runs, we also use net trade as a measure
of competitiveness at the industry level. Our unit of observation is a
country-sector-year combination where sectors are deﬁned by the
OECD’s STAN database.
Our central hypothesis is that the effect of high energy prices on in-
dustry TFP is affected by the industry’s capacity to adapt. Like Commins
et al. (2011), our identiﬁcation strategy relies on the cross-industry
variation in how energy taxes and prices affect performance. In order
to identify the effect of human capital, we interact energy taxes and
prices with industry-level relative wages.
Our sample used is a panel of industry × country pairs tracked over
the period 1990–2003 from the OECD’s STAN database, comparable to
the data used by Enervoldsen et al. (2009). Working at the industry
level has advantages and drawbacks. On the one hand, identiﬁcation is
obviously not as sharp as in Commins et al. (2011) who perform their
analysis at the ﬁrm level. On the other hand, TFP improvements at the
ﬁrm level can be obtained by “passing the buck” of adjustment to either
customers or suppliers. For instance, energy-intensive operations could
be outsourced, producing TFP gains at the ﬁrm level that have no coun-
terpart at the aggregate level and whose offsets would be difﬁcult to
track. Working at the industry level allows us to “internalize” at least
some of these spillovers, although not those with an international
dimension.
Our main regressors of interest, energy taxes and prices, are
country × year speciﬁc. This might lead to overestimate the energy
taxes faced by certain industries, mostly energy-intensive ones, given
the possibility of exemptions which can be attributed. Data limitations
do not allow us to dig deeper into this issue. Some recent papers
on the response of gasoline consumption to a change in taxes also sug-
gest that the short run economic impact of introducing or tightening
energy or CO2 taxes is not equivalent to that of rising fossil-fuel prices
(Baranzini and Weber 2013; Davis and Kilian, 2011; Li et al., 2012).
While price changes due to policy intervention are seen to be rather per-
manent and less volatile, market price changes can be seen as transitory
phenomena. We deal with this by explicitly separating the effect of
energy prices (net of taxation) from energy taxes.
We control for heterogeneity at the industry level using both time-
variant and time-invariant industry characteristics. The latter are4 Results with the index-based TFP derivation are available upon request.represented by a full set of industry × country ﬁxed effects. We also in-
clude year dummies, which are not collinear with energy prices and
taxes due to country-speciﬁc evolution of both exchange rates and ener-
gy taxation.
As a robustness test, we also apply the approach proposed in Rajan
and Zingales (1998) and subsequent papers. That is, we eliminate the
energy price variable and instead include a full set of country × year
effects. This approach makes it impossible to estimate the absolute
effect of energy-price changes, but it identiﬁes their differential effect
across industries.
We ﬁnd that the marginal effect (ME) of energy taxes on TFP (and
net trade in the robustness runs), while being negative for low-wage
sectors, becomes gradually positive for sectors with higher wage levels.
At high wage levels, the tendency is sufﬁciently strong to produce
signiﬁcant positive MEs for some industries and countries. Thus, some
industries seem to react so strongly to energy-tax shocks that their
TFP ends up higher, in conformity with the Porter Hypothesis.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the empirical
literature, Section 3 presents our estimation strategy and the data.
Section 4 presents and discusses results and robustness runs. Section 5
concludes.
2. Environmental regulation and economic efﬁciency: What do we
know?
The existing evidence on the PH, surveyed, inter alia, in Jaffe et al.
(2003) and Vollebergh (2006), is at best a half-full half-empty bottle.
Jaffe et al. (1995) reviewed 16 empirical studies of the effects of envi-
ronmental regulation on competitiveness in the US manufacturing
sector, and concluded that “[…] there is relatively little evidence to sup-
port the hypothesis that environmental regulations have had a large ad-
verse effect on competitiveness, however that elusive term is deﬁned”
(p. 157). Albrecht (1998) found that early adoption ofMontreal Protocol
measures (CFC phase-out) by the US and Denmark did not affect the
competitive position, measured through bilateral trade positions, of
refrigerator and industrial-cooler producers; however, early adoption
is likely to have been endogenous to the outcome. Snyder et al. (2003)
studied the effect of chlorine regulation on a panel of US chlorine
manufacturing plants over 1976–2001. They found that adopting plants
had a lower probability of exit than non-adopting ones, although the PH
is about the absolute performance of regulated ﬁrms, not about the rel-
ative performance of adopting vs. non-adopting ﬁrms. In the same vein,
Murti and Kumar (2003) found someevidence of better performance by
ﬁrms that also had a better environmental compliance record among a
panel of 92 Indian manufacturing plants. Lanoie et al. (2008) construct-
ed a sector-speciﬁc measure of the stringency of environmental regula-
tion for a panel of manufacturing sectors in Québec and found that,
while current regulatory stringency reduced productivity growth,
lagged stringency raised it, suggesting learning and adaptation effects.
Enervoldsen et al. (2009) estimated the impact of energy prices on
gross value added for a panel of European industrial sectors and found
that while they had a moderate negative impact on output via higher
unit energy and labour costs, they also had a relatively strong direct
impact on output, which they interpret as evidence that energy taxes
stimulate product innovation, which in turn raises demand for their
products.
So much for the half-full bottle. As for the half-empty, Palmer et al.
(1995) surveyed ﬁrms affected by environmental regulation, including
those cited by Porter and van der Linde (1995) as success stories, and
found that most ﬁrms declared that regulation was a net cost (see also
Joshi et al., 1997; Morgenstern et al., 1999). However, that managers
would complain about environmental regulations in interviews might
not come as a surprise. Becker and Henderson (2000) found that plant
births at the country level were reduced by current regulatory stringen-
cyproxied by lowattainment status under the CleanAir Act. Lanoie et al.
(2011) used a recent OECD cross-country ﬁrm-level survey to regress
Fig. 1. Comparison of two measures of lnTFP: index and residual-based.
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jective (self-assessed) index of business performance on ﬁrm char-
acteristics and a measure of environmental regulation stringency.
They found that environmental stringency raised the probability of
doing environmental R&D but had a negative effect on self-
assessed performance.
The effect of energy prices and taxes on TFP and innovation has been
studied by yet another substantial literature, with, again, ambiguous
results. Berndt and Wood (1986) found that rising energy prices in
the 1970s and 80s contributed to the productivity slowdown. Rose
and Joskow (1990) found no signiﬁcant effect of fuel prices on the adop-
tion of a new fuel-saving technology in the US electricity-generation
sector. By contrast, Jaffe and Stavins (1995) looked at the adoption of
thermal insulation in residential construction in the US between 1979
and 1988 and found a positive and signiﬁcant response of mean energy
efﬁciency to energy-price changes. Interestingly, they found a larger re-
sponse to changes in adoption costs than to changes in energy prices,
possibly suggesting credit constraints. Finally (although this list is by
no means exhaustive), Popp (2002) ﬁnds that higher energy prices
raise patenting activity in energy-related ﬁelds, although the effect
fades over time. Thus, in spite of a voluminous literature, the effect
of energy prices on innovation and productivity is still very much an
open question.
Part of the problem with the PH is that it is cast in characteristically
loose terms, in particular as regards “competitiveness”, a term with
which economists have difﬁculty. In addition to the paper already
cited above by Lanoie et al. (2008), a number of other papers have
looked at the effect of environmental regulation on Total Factor Pro-
ductivity (TFP) growth. Again, the evidence is conﬂicting. Gollop and
Roberts (1983) constructed a ﬁrm-speciﬁc measure of regulatory strin-
gency in the electric-power industry and found that emission regula-
tions signiﬁcantly raised generating costs, reducing the average rate of
productivity growth by 0.59 percentage points per year for constrained
utilities. Gray and Shadbegian (1998) found that pollution abatement
investments crowded out productive investments almost entirely in
the pulp & paper industry. Greenstone (1998) found that air-pollution
regulation had a slight positive effect on unit costs, implying a small
negative effect on productivity. On the other hand, Berman and Bui
(2001) found signiﬁcant productivity increases associated with air-
pollution regulation on a sample of oil reﬁneries. Shadbegian and Gray
(2005) failed to ﬁnd a negative correlation between abatement costs
and productivity, although they did not ﬁnd a positive one either.
Recently, Commins et al. (2011) used a panel of European ﬁrms
taken from the AMADEUS database to analyse the impact of energy
taxes on ﬁrm characteristics such as changes in TFP, employment levels,
return on capital and investment. The sample covers the period 1996–
2007. They interacted country energy taxes with sectoral dummies toobtain sector-speciﬁc effects. Depending on sectors, they identiﬁed
negative, positive or non-signiﬁcant effects of energy taxes on TFP.
Another strand of the literature has looked at the relationship
between environmental regulation and innovation. This is particularly
important as technical change is both a factor of uncertainty in the
costs of future environmental regulations and a likely causal link –
alongside improved managerial efﬁciency—relating regulation to
improved “competitiveness”. Lanjouw and Mody (1996) showed, on a
panel of countries over 1971–88, that higher pollution abatement
costs (as a % of GDP) led to a higher share of environmental patents in
the country’s total patent count with a one to two years delay. Jaffe
and Palmer (1997) showed, on a panel of US industries between 1974
and 1991, that lagged abatement expenditure is positively correlated
with current R&D spending, although not with patenting activity. By
contrast, Brunnermeier and Cohen (2003) found a signiﬁcant and posi-
tive correlation between (contemporaneous) abatement expenditure
and successful environmental patent applications. Hence, the empirical
evidence of the effect of environmental regulation on patent activity,
which is clearly also only an imperfect measure of innovation, is so far
rather positive.
There exists also a sizable literature on the diffusion of innovation
that identiﬁes determinants of the adoption of new technologies (for a
review, see Hall, 2006). The main determinants can be grouped into
ﬁrm and industry characteristics, the extent of usage of the technology
in the industry or by similar ﬁrms, adoption costs, and inducement
effects such as prices and taxes or public incentives and regulation.
When looking at adoption at the level of industries, the epidemic effect
(spread by contact) plays a lesser role and industry characteristics a
greater one.Worker skill levels regularly emerge as a determining char-
acteristic (Hall and Khan, 2003, who refer this observation back to
Rosenberg, 1972). When skills are insufﬁcient for uptake, suppliers of
new technologies offer training to increase it. A broad, albeit imperfect,
indicator of the skill level is the relative level of wages in the industry.
Skills (or education or human capital) are not the only determinant
of relative wages, yet they play a dominant role. Edin and Zetterberg
(1992) showed that human capital is more than ten times more impor-
tant than industry variables in explaining wage differentials in Sweden.
Gibbons et al. (2005) showed both theoretically and empirically that
high-wage sectors employ high-skill workers and offer high returns
to workers’ skills. Estimates by Kniesner and Leeth (1991) show only
little effects of the riskiness of jobs on average wage levels. A related
effect of skill levels on the impact of higher energy prices might
operate through R&D: industries with higher human capital tend to
be better able to respond by intensifying research. But this is not
the whole story. One expects that many adjustment activities are not
reﬂected in R&D statistics but rather consist of small optimisation
activities.
The main contribution of the present paper to the literature is
that we test whether the effect of taxes and energy prices on TFP
and net trade can be mediated through adaptive capacity, proxied
by relative wage levels. This is novel and has not been investigated
so far.
3. Material and methods
3.1. Empirical methodology
As introduced above, we measure industry-country performance by
a total factor productivity (TFP) measure. Let Kict be sector i’s capital
stock in country c at time t, Lict its labor input, Yict its measured value
added, and αic the average share of capital in the value added of sector
i in country c over the sample period. Lacking disaggregate data other
production factors (e.g. human capital) are excluded from the analysis.
The data is taken from the OECD STANdatabase. Energy and other inter-
mediate inputs (material) are excluded from this ﬁrst estimation as we
focus on value added instead of output. The TFP index is then deﬁned
Table 1
Changes in energy prices incl. taxes for the time period 1990–2003.
Country % change in the price of automotive diesel: (Δp/p)*100
Annual percentage change Total change over
time period
Min Max Median
Belgium −8.6 24.9 3.8 43.3
Czech Rep. −13.2 53.1 0.5 83.2
Denmark −3.0 40.4 7.0 187.2
Finland −21.2 24.7 1.9 5.9
France −5.4 23.7 2.0 45.4
Italy −5.0 20.9 4.5 73.2
Note: Annual percentage change in the net consumer price of automotive diesel faced by
the industrial sector. The last column gives the percentage change in the net consumer
price of automotive diesel for the time period 1990–2003. Source: IEA.
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T FPict ¼
Yict
Kict
αic Lict
1−αic
ð1Þ
Taking the natural logarithm of both sides of Eq. (1) gives us:
lnT FPict ¼ lnYict−αic lnKict− 1−αicð Þ lnLict ð2Þ
As is apparent from Eq. (2), productivity can also be calculatedwhile
estimating the coefﬁcients of a constrained panel production-function
such as:
lnYict ¼ α1 lnKict þ 1−α1ð Þ lnLict þ ηic þ μ t þ εict ð3Þ
lnT F^Pict ¼ lnYict−α^1 lnKict− 1−α^1ð Þ lnLict ð4Þ
where εict is assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean and
constant variance, ηic is an industry × country ﬁxed effect and μt is a
year effect. α1 has been estimated using a constrained OLS estimator
after having ﬁrst-differentiated the data.
Fig. 1 shows a scatter plot of TFP estimates (in logs) calculated from
Eq. (2) (on the horizontal axis) and from Eq. (4) (on the vertical axis). It
can be seen that results are coherent (i.e. close to or on the diagonal)
although there is also substantial variation.
Bothmethods are used in the literature to compute TFP. Qualitative-
ly, the choice between the two methods has no impact on our mainFig. 2. Changes in total energy pﬁndings. For the sake of brevity, estimates reported throughout this
paper are based on estimation of Eq. (4) TFP measures.
In the second step, we use our TFP estimates or net trade (the log of
the exports to imports ratio) as the dependent variable in an equation
where energy taxes and energy prices (net of taxes) are the key explan-
atory variables introduced, linearly and interacted with a measure of
relative labour compensation. Speciﬁcally we have:
lnT F^Pict ¼ β0 þ β1 lnPct þ β2 lnwict þ β3 lnPct  lnwictð Þ
þγTXict þ δic þ δt þ uict
ð5Þ
where Pct is the tax of energy (and similarly the energy user price net of
taxes introduced simultaneously) in country c and year t,wict is industry
i’s labour compensation per employee relative to the manufacturing
average in country c and year t (permanent inter-industry differences
in skills are picked up by industry × country dummies), Xict is a vector
of control variables (in logs) at the industry × country × year level, δic
is a ﬁxed effect at the industry × country level, and δt is a year dummy
and uict is the error term, normally distributed with zero mean and
constant variance. All data are deﬂated by industry-speciﬁc price indices
and converted to U.S. dollar values. As a result, all variables are ex-
pressed in base year 2000 U.S. dollars.
In spite of inﬂation adjustment, movements in measured TFP may
pick up insufﬁciently controlled movements in prices as well as quanti-
ties produced and therefore reﬂect changes in industry structure or
market power. As discussed in Section 3.2.3, additional control variables
are introduced in the vector Xict to capture these effects.
Estimation is by OLS and we allow for an arbitrary covariance struc-
ture over time by clustering standard errors at the industry × country
level. In a robustness exercise, we estimate Eq. (5) by GMM in order
to control for persistence in TFP and for endogeneity of the R&D spend-
ing, import-penetration and export share of production variables.
3.2. Data
3.2.1. Data sources and coverage
We use a panel data set that covers 11 manufacturing sectors (clas-
siﬁed at the 2 digit level ISIC Rev. 3) in 6 European countries (Belgium,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France and Italy) over 1990–2003,
yielding a sample size of almost 500 observations. Given the need to
measure productivity from a set of industrial data and to combine thisrices for automotive diesel.
Table 2
Country-level taxation of automotive diesel for the period 1990–2003.
Country Tax wedge in 1990 (%) Tax wedge in 2003 (%) Tax change over the period 1990–2003 (%) Incentive taxes affecting automotive diesel price
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Belgium 46.8 47.0 44.1 -
Czech Rep. 55.1 45.4 50.9 -
Denmark 0 50.7 395.5a CO2 tax (1992)
Finland 58.7 48.2 −13.1 CO2 tax (1990),
Excise Taxes for sulphur content (1987, 1995)
France 57.5 59.1 49.6 -
Italy 60.0 55.1 59.3 CO2 tax (1999)
Note: our measure of the tax wedge is equal to the ratio of total taxes over net consumer price where total taxes and net consumer price both include taxes levied by private bodies on a
non-governmental basis but do not include the amount of the value-added tax. The last column displays, if any, incentive taxes affecting automotive diesel use that have become effective
or that have been changed during the time period (the number in brackets is the year of introduction of the tax). Source: IEA, INFRAS (2007). aComputed over the period 1991–2003.
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other control variables, this sample is the largest possible dataset that
we could obtain. Our sample has the advantage that these countries
have close economic and institutional structures, trade heavily with
each other and share similar cultural and economic values, which in
turn reduces unobserved heterogeneity in the data. The ﬂip side of
the coin is that our estimationwill be restricted to datawith limited var-
iation. This means that it will be more difﬁcult to identify signiﬁcant
effects, but if we ﬁnd them, then we can be more conﬁdent. However,
it also somewhat limits the external validity of our results, as extrapola-
tion to countries with characteristics very different from European
countries would be difﬁcult.
We use the Energy Prices and Taxes database of the International
Energy Agency (IEA) and follow Kilian (2008) by selecting prices and
taxes directly relevant to economic agents instead of using information
on crude oil. We use the price of automotive diesel, one important type
of energy use in industry andmost importantly themost complete price
and tax data for our sample.5 In addition, as a robustness test, we also
use natural gas taxes and prices.
3.2.2. Energy prices (ADP) and taxes (ADT): stylized facts
Table 1 reports changes in energy prices (including taxes) for auto-
motive diesel in local currency units for the countries in our sample
over the period 1990–2003. It can be seen that there is substantial var-
iation in energy prices over the sample period, both over time and
across countries. A clear upward trend of total energy prices can howev-
er be identiﬁed. While Italy, the Czech Republic and Denmark report
large increases, energy prices in Finland increase much less.
Fig. 2 shows the changes in energy prices over time in detail. Two
main periods of increasing energy prices can be identiﬁed. The ﬁrst
one at the beginning of the nineties, where two countries introduced
for the ﬁrst time energy and carbon taxes with environmental objec-
tives (cf. Table 2) and a second one, around 2000, where all countries
see their energy prices increase.
Energy taxation is one determinant of energy prices. The Porter
Hypothesis works through policy intervention and not market prices.
As discussed in the introduction, empirical studies indeed also found
that energy consumers react differently to endogenous price changes
than to price changes induced through policy intervention. We are
therefore mainly interested in variations in energy taxes. Table 2 and
Fig. 3 display changes in energy taxes for automotive diesel in local
currency units (ADT) for our sample.
All countries except Finland see their energy taxes also increase over
the sample period, with themost important increase in Denmarkwhich5 We refrain from using a quantity weighted average price/tax not only because of lim-
ited data availability for the other price and tax series, but also for the fact that this would
introduce additional endogeneity, as the fuel mix is expected to be the results of the be-
havioral adaptation of ﬁrms.is due to the absence of any tax in 1990. In the early 1990s the countries
in our sample, which were among the ﬁrst to introduce environmental-
ly motivated energy taxes, raised their taxes on automotive diesel for
environmental purposes and again at the end of the 1990s. The effect
of environmental policy changes on industry-level TFP and net trade re-
vealing relevant information for the debate on the economic cost of en-
vironmental regulation is investigated in Section 4.
3.2.3. Additional control variables
To control for other factors that determine TFP and net trade and are
not captured by the two sets of year and industry× countryﬁxed effects,
we introduce additional variables, most of which are taken from the
OECD STAN database (data sources are given in Table A1 of the appen-
dix). As suggested in earlier studies, we include lagged R&D expendi-
tures (R&D spendings) which we expect to have a positive effect on
TFP and net trade (e.g. Grifﬁth et al, 2004). The lag aims at avoiding
simultaneity bias between contemporaneous TFP and R&D spending.
Two variables – export share of production (Export Share) and import
penetration (computed as the ratio of imports to total domestic de-
mand, Import Pen.) –measure the intensity of international competi-
tion in each sector (e.g. Nickell, 1996). They are included as controls
for unobserved components of competitiveness with positive expected
coefﬁcients as more competition should spur productivity.6 Moreover
we expect competition within a sector, measured by the number of
establishments (Nbr. of Estab), to inﬂuence our measure of TFP and
net trade. As a robustness test we also us the price-cost margin (PCM)
as analysed by Boulhol (2008).7 If competition spurs productivity, a
negative coefﬁcient should be observed, if market power spurs pro-
ductivity, a positive coefﬁcient should be observed. We also include
exchange rates (expressed as local currency per US$, US Exch. Rate)
because their movements might affect mark-ups via changes in import
or export prices of ﬁnal goods, as well as energy and other imported
input prices (e.g. Copeland and Kahn, 2012). The expected effect of
exchange rates depends on the relationship between imported inputs
and exported ﬁnal goods within industries. Finally, the inclusion of the
value of output (Output) allows capturing effects of scale economies
on productivity (e.g. Nickell, 1996). A positive coefﬁcient is expected
for this variable.
4. Results
This section discusses regression results on the relationship between
energy taxes and industry-level productivity. Section 4.1. presents the
main results of the effect of automotive diesel taxes on industry TFP,
while Section 4.2. shows several robustness tests, mainly using an
alternative energy price variable (natural gas) or net trade as the6 These variables are not included in the net trade regressions, since the dependent var-
iable is already constructed using import and export data. Including these variableswould
not add insights and lead to tautological relations.
7 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this measure.
Fig. 3. Changes in automotive diesel taxation over the sample period 1990–2003.
132 C. Gonseth et al. / Energy Economics 48 (2015) 127–135dependent variable. Given the inclusion of interaction terms, marginal ef-
fects must be computed to show the differentiated impact of energy tax
increases on competitiveness measures of sectors with different adaptive
capacity. Section 4.3. displays and discusses the marginal effects.
4.1. Energy tax effects on productivity: baseline results
Random effects (RE), ﬁxed effects (FE) and Difference GMM estima-
tion results for Eq. (5) are shown in Table 3. All t-statistics are corrected
for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.
The FE estimator allows us to control for unobserved heterogeneity
among industry × country combinations and the Hausman test rejects
the hypothesis of equality of coefﬁcients for the RE and FE estimations
(column (1) vs. (2)), so estimates obtained from the latter should
be preferred. The sharp increase in the reported R-squared from column
(1) to (2) also conﬁrms that the ﬁxed effects are covering a large
amount of total variation of the dependent variable by controlling for
unobserved heterogeneity among industries and countries. The ﬁxed
effect estimation in column (2) is therefore our preferred speciﬁcation.
In column (3), the approach by Rajan and Zingales (1998) is used and
sets of country × year and industryﬁxed effects are used. Column (4) re-
ports estimates with GMM in ﬁrst differences8 allowing the introduc-
tion of the lagged dependent variable and to account for the possible
endogeneity of explanatory variables. Given the limited sample at
hand (both panel dimensions are rather small), one should take these
results with caution.
Automotive diesel tax (ADT) and price (ADP) have a negative di-
rect effect on TFP while their interactions with labor compensation
have a positive effect on TFP. The interaction term of labor com-
pensation with taxes is signiﬁcant in the RE and FE estimations, while
the interaction term with energy prices is signiﬁcant in the GMM
speciﬁcation.
Among the coefﬁcients on control variables, scale has the expected
and signiﬁcant effect. Exchange rates display mostly a positive and
signiﬁcant one. The number of establishments has a negative effect on
TFP in columns (1)-(3) indicating that concentrated sectors report
higher TFP. The export share of production and import penetration
display mainly non-signiﬁcant coefﬁcients. Except in the FE estima-
tions, where a signiﬁcant negative effect of the export share on TFP8 SystemGMM results have also been computed but given the small sample size, results
are globally insigniﬁcant and not reported.is displayed. This is not as expected and might be explained by the
strong correlation between the trade variables (correlation coefﬁ-
cient of 0.75) aswell as endogeneity issues, which is why both variables
are instrumented with their suitable lags in the GMM estimation.
4.2. Robustness tests
Table 4 and taxes for natural gas are used, while columns (2) to
(5) stick with the automotive diesel energy carrier but use net trade in-
stead of TFP as dependent variable or the price-cost margin instead of
the number of establishments to measure competition in the sector.
Column (5) reports the Rajan and Zingales (1998) estimation for net
trade. Note that in the net trade case, our preferred estimation is the
RE given in column (3), since the Hausman test allows us to focus on
the more efﬁcient RE estimator. In all cases, except for the estimation
with country*year ﬁxed effects in column (5) the coefﬁcient on the in-
teraction term between energy taxes and adaptive capacity, is positive
and highly signiﬁcant. With few exceptions, other effects are qualita-
tively unchanged. The coefﬁcient on the price-cost markup is positive
and signiﬁcant. It suggests that in the present framework market
power leads to higher TFP. In columns (1), and (3)–(5) the interaction
term on energy prices (net of taxes) also displays a signiﬁcant positive
interaction term with our measure for adaptive capacity. At the excep-
tion of column (5), it is however always smaller and less signiﬁcant
than the coefﬁcient for taxes. Overall, previous results are conﬁrmed. Es-
timated coefﬁcients associated to the variables interacting energy taxes
(and to some extent prices)with labor compensation are positive. These
positive coefﬁcients suggest that the negative effect of energy tax and
price shocks might be mitigated by the adaptive capacity of industries
with relatively highly qualiﬁed workers. This is in line with theory
while at the same time reﬂecting the differentiated effects across sec-
tors. In order to assess the overall impact of energy taxes on industries,
the marginal effects are displayed and discussed in the next section.
4.3. Marginal effects for TFP and net trade
Fig. 4 for automotive diesel and TFP, Fig. 5 for automotive diesel and
net trade and Fig. 6 for natural gas and TFP display the marginal effects
(MEs) togetherwith their 95% conﬁdence intervals.9 They are computed9 Calculated using the nlcom command of Stata.
Table 3
Regression estimates: ln TFP as dependent variable.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Random
effects
Fixed
effects
Fixed
effects
Diff.
GMM
Dependent variable: ln TFP
l.ln TFP 0.40**
[0.16]
ln Export Share −0.072 −0.24* −0.10*** −0.32
[0.060] [0.12] [0.032] [0.25]
ln Import Pen. −0.12 −0.12 0.022 −0.26
[0.086] [0.17] [0.048] [0.36]
ln Labour comp. 1.28** 1.60** 0.47* 0.22
[0.54] [0.66] [0.28] [0.82]
l.ln R&D spendings 0.061 0.049 −0.032 0.015
[0.040] [0.037] [0.020] [0.028]
ln Output 0.12*** 0.44*** 0.22*** 0.34***
[0.048] [0.10] [0.057] [0.13]
ln Nbr. of Estab. −0.061* −0.024 −0.078*** 0.0019
[0.032] [0.023] [0.029] [0.025]
ln US Exch. Rate 0.14*** 0.85*** 0.58*
[0.052] [0.25] [0.30]
ln ADT −5.89*** −6.53*** −1.11
[1.58] [1.95] [1.98]
ln ADP −0.40 −1.40 −2.14***
[1.05] [1.01] [0.73]
ln ADT × ln Labour comp. 1.24*** 1.41*** 0.55** 0.23
[0.34] [0.42] [0.23] [0.42]
ln ADP × ln Labour comp. 0.13 0.31 0.13 0.41**
[0.23] [0.23] [0.14] [0.16]
Industry FE no no yes no
Country FE no no no no
Industry × Country FE no yes no yes
Country × Year FE no no yes no
Year FE yes yes no yes
Observations 466 466 466 343
R-squared 0.040 0.851 0.591
Prob N chi2 (Hausman test) b0.0001
Prob N z (test AR(1) in levels) 0.671
Prob N z (test AR(2) in levels) 0.949
Hansen test of over-identifying
restrictions
0.126
Notes: ln stands for the natural logarithm and l. for a variable lagged by one period. The de-
pendent variable ln TFP is derived econometrically (see Section 3.1 above). In column (4),
the export share of production and import penetration are treated as potentially endogenous
(lags 2–5), the ﬁrst lags of TFP and R&D spending are treated as predetermined (lags 1–4),
while the other variables are treated as strictly exogenous. Robust standard errors in brackets;
Standard errors are clustered at the country × year level in column (3) and at the industry ×
country level in columns (1)-(2); *signiﬁcant at 10%; **signiﬁcant at 5%; ***signiﬁcant at 1%.
Table 4
Robustness runs: using the price-costmargin and natural gas taxes and prices as indepen-
dent variables and net trade as dependent variable.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fixed
effects
Fixed
effects
Random
effects
Fixed
effects
Fixed
effects
Dep. Var.: ln TFP ln TFP ln X/M ln X/M ln X/M
Energy carrier: NG AD AD AD AD
ln Export Share −0.13 −0.058
[0.12] [0.11]
ln Import Pen. −0.20 −0.15
[0.16] [0.12]
ln Labour comp. −3.63 1.44*** 2.09*** 2.19*** 1.38
[2.16] [0.49] [0.44] [0.48] [0.84]
l.ln R&D spendings 0.058** 0.052 0.018 0.019 −0.043
[0.027] [0.038] [0.023] [0.025] [0.028]
ln Output 0.31*** 0.23*** 0.22*** 0.30*** 1.21***
[0.098] [0.081] [0.073] [0.090] [0.083]
ln Nbr. of Estab. −0.068 0.033* 0.036* 0.17***
[0.052] [0.017] [0.020] [0.048]
ln PCM 3.16***
[0.60]
ln US Exch. Rate 0.82*** 0.36*** 0.064 0.28
[0.28] [0.10] [0.058] [0.19]
ln Taxes −2.05*** −5.52*** −5.01*** −4.78***
[0.45] [1.46] [1.52] [1.57]
ln Price net of taxes −2.43 −1.01 −2.79** −2.88**
[2.10] [0.73] [1.17] [1.27]
ln Taxes × ln Labour comp. 0.47*** 1.19*** 1.09*** 1.04*** −0.50
[0.095] [0.32] [0.32] [0.34] [0.58]
ln Price net of taxes × ln
Labour comp.
0.49 0.24 0.57** 0.57** 0.78*
[0.43] [0.17] [0.24] [0.26] [0.43]
Industry FE no no no no yes
Country FE no no no no no
Industry × Country FE yes yes no yes no
Country × Year FE no no no no yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes no
Observations 298 466 466 466 466
R-squared 0.873 0.911 0.0059 0.982 0.711
Prob N chi2 (Hausman test) b0.0001 0.434
Notes: ln stands for the natural logarithm, l. for a variable lagged by one period, NG for
natural gas and AD for automotive diesel. Robust standard errors in brackets; Standard er-
rors are clustered at the country × year level in column (5) and at the industry × country
level in columns (1)–(4); *signiﬁcant at 10%; **signiﬁcant at 5%; ***signiﬁcant at 1%.
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ple. For each industry, the ME was obtained as a weighted average of
the country-sector speciﬁc MEs evaluated at wic, which is the sample-
period average log of the deviation from average labour compensation
for industry i and country c.10 The weights were based on the average
value of output of each country × sector pair.
The MEs of energy taxes on productivity is positive in up to ﬁve sec-
tors. This seems to pick up adaptation processes generating unforeseen
gains (if they had been foreseen, they would have been uncorrelated to
energy tax shocks). Figs. 4 to 6 show that at least two of the MEs com-
puted at the sectoral level are signiﬁcantly positive. The two sectors
“coke, reﬁned petroleum products and nuclear fuel” and “chemicals
and chemical products” seem to be able to adapt to energy taxes as pre-
dicted by the Porter hypothesis. The deviation from average labour
compensation for these sectors is greater than 50%meaning that the av-
erage employee in these industries earns a wage more than 50% higher
than the manufacturing average.
At the opposite, there is also some evidence that up to three sectors
will be harmed by higher energy taxes because of their insufﬁcient
adaptive capacity. In fact, the average labour compensation per10 Evaluated atwic, the overall effect of higher energy taxes on TFP is positive for 46% of
the country-sector pairs included in our sample.employee for these sectors lies around or below 80% of themanufactur-
ing average. These three sectors are the food products, beverages, tobac-
co sector, themanufacturing n.e.c. and recycling sector, thewood, wood
and corn products sector. In between these two extremes, the effect of
energy taxes is quite uncertain or negligible for four out of the eleven
manufacturing sectors contained in our sample.
It might be argued that the most energy and pollution intensive in-
dustries also have the most to beneﬁt from adapting to higher energy
prices. This might not be adaptive capacity but simply a necessity to
cope with higher energy prices. Unfortunately we were not able with
the available data to precisely identify the energy intensive sectors in
our sample. In the international trade literature, the following sectors
are usually considered to be energy intensive: Paper and products,
Industrial chemicals, Other non-metallic mineral products, Iron and
steel, Non-ferrous metals (reﬁnery products are usually excluded).
These sectors do not form a compact group in Figs. 4 to 6.
Overall we ﬁnd that it is important to take into account industry
adaptabilitywhen identifying the effect of energy taxes on industry per-
formance. While some industries can even beneﬁt from increased ener-
gy taxes, others, mainly low wage sectors, can see their performance
decrease.
5. Conclusion and policy implications
On the basis of a panel of industries tracked for six European
countries over more than ten years, we ﬁnd that the impact of rising
Fig. 4.Marginal effects of energy taxes on TFP: estimated percentage change in sectoral total
factor productivity when energy taxes on automotive diesel rise by 1% (preferred FEmodel).
Fig. 5.Marginal effects of energy taxes on net trade: estimated percentage change in sec-
toral net trade when energy taxes on automotive diesel rise by 1% (preferred RE model).
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previous ﬁndings in the literature. We ﬁnd that the impact depends
upon the adaptive capacity of each manufacturing industry which is
measured in this paper by their relative level of labor compensation.
For high-wage industries, the adaptation effect is strong enough to pro-
duce signiﬁcant increases in TFP and net trade. The inclusion of a full set
of industry × country ﬁxed effects ensures that the measured effect is
“within-industry” and not driven by unobserved heterogeneity.
It is likely that industries with relatively high labor compensation
reﬂect the reactivity to energy-tax shocks and the active search for
more efﬁcient processes, whether through true knowledge creation,
knowledge absorption, or better organization. Could it be driven by a
selection effect? In the long run, higher energy taxes are likely to induce
the exit of the least productive ﬁrms in each industry; in addition, only
themost productive ones could afford the ﬁxed costs and risks of higher
R&D spending or to pay for the most skilled workers. Thus, energy-tax
shocks might be expected to partition ﬁrms, with the most productive
investing to reduce energy costs, the middle ones simply suffering re-
duced proﬁtability, and the least productive ones exiting. This could
produce a rise in industry-wide average productivity. Only ﬁrm-level
analysis could tell whether this selection (between-ﬁrm) process is at
play and whether it is the most important quantitatively. However, it
is a long-run phenomenon that is unlikely to be driving the contempo-
raneous effects that we identify so strongly in the industry-level data.
The policy implications of our ﬁnding are intuitive but potentially im-
portant. Emission-regulation shocks, inasmuch as they raise the cost asso-
ciatedwith the use of fossil fuels, can be expected to have a negative effecton competitiveness, but a positive one for those industries with the
highest capacity to adapt, as proxied by their labor expenditures. This sug-
gests a policy aimed at improving the capacity of ﬁrms to adapt through
higher qualiﬁcations prior to the adoption of stiff emission standards. If
effective, this could turn subsequent environmental regulation into the
kind of win-win situation that Porter and van der Linde (1995) identiﬁed.
Several questions of interest are left for future research. First, in order
to reﬁne our understanding of the mechanisms at work it is crucial to
identify the deeper reasons for the linkages between adaptive capacity
and the response of industries to energy taxes.Withwhich concretemea-
sures do ﬁrms with high adaptive capacity mitigate the adverse effects of
energy taxes? To answer this question more detailed ﬁrm level data are
necessary. Second, what would be needed to help industries with low
adaptive capacity to turn high energy prices into a winning situation for
them? This would help to increase the political acceptance of progressive
energy policies. Third, most studies focus on high income countries, but
energy taxes are also commonly applied in developing countries, al-
though rather to ﬁll government budgets than for climate policy reasons.
Would the present conclusions hold for industries in developing coun-
tries? These research avenues should be investigated in the future.Acknowledgements
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Fig. 6.Marginal effects of energy taxes on TFP: estimated percentage change in sectoral
total factor productivitywhen energy taxes on natural gas rise by 1% (preferred FEmodel).
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